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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CENTRAL DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

PETER L. JENSEN AND THOMAS C.
TEKULVE, JR.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. CV11-05316 R (AGRx)
[Assigned to Hon. Manuel L. Real]

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT PETER L. JENSEN'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

Date: September 17, 2012
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Crtrm.: 8

Trial Date: October 16, 2012

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 On June 24, 2011, when the SEC initiated this action, it leveled charges
3 against Peter Jensen that not only lacked evidentiary support, but were, in several
4 instances, flatly contrary to the evidence in its possession. Now, fourteen months
5 later, and after the depositions of 23 fact witnesses, the SEC continues to ignore the
6 facts on the ground, having moved last month for summary judgment on the entirety
7 of the profuse allegations, claims, and remedies found in its 57-page Complaint.

8 Mr. Jensen's own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment deals with the facts
9 as they are, and is more modest in scope. While the record shows that there is no
10 merit to *any* part of the SEC's case, Mr. Jensen brings this motion for partial
11 summary judgment on the following claims, issues and remedies that
12 unquestionably are beyond dispute and are ripe for resolution without trial:

13 ***Mr. Jensen's lack of scienter with respect to the VLC and WSS***
14 ***transactions.***¹ The SEC has failed to develop any evidence showing that Mr. Jensen
15 knew that recognition of revenue from the VLC and WSS transactions in 2007 in
16 any way constituted fraud. Indeed, every witness who was asked confirmed that Mr.
17 Jensen had no involvement in these transactions and exercised no role in the
18 recognition of revenue from the transactions. Accordingly, the SEC's fraud-based
19 claims against Mr. Jensen with respect to these transactions (first cause of action,
20 violation of Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)), second
21

22 ¹ In addition to the VLC and WSS transactions, the SEC alleges that Mr. Jensen
23 committed fraud in connection with two other transactions referred to as Opus and
24 Thermax. While Mr. Jensen vigorously denies any fraud with respect to the Opus
25 and Thermax transactions, he acknowledges that he had some involvement in both
26 Opus and Thermax, and that the SEC disputes the accounting for those transactions.
27 Accordingly, Mr. Jensen does not move for summary judgment on the Opus and
28 Thermax transactions, giving due consideration to the standards for granting
summary judgment under FRCP 56.

1 cause of action, violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. §78j(b),
2 SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5), and third cause of action, violation of
3 Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78m(a), and SEC Rules 12b-20,
4 13a-1, and 13a-13, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, and 240.13a-13), should
5 not proceed to trial.

6 ***No control person liability with respect to the VLC and WSS transactions.***

7 Mr. Jensen was not a control person during the time of the VLC and WSS
8 transactions. Other than the assertion that Mr. Jensen was CEO of Basin Water and
9 2007, the SEC has failed in its attempts to develop *facts* showing that Mr. Jensen
10 was a “control person” for purposes of Section 20 liability under the Exchange Act
11 (15 U.S.C. §78t(a)) (Second and Third Causes of Action). Again, witness after
12 witness in this matter has confirmed that Michael Stark, Mr. Jensen’s designated
13 successor, had effectively taken control of Basin Water from Mr. Jensen in early
14 2007, and that Mr. Jensen played no role in the VLC and WSS transactions
15 themselves or in the accounting for those transactions.

16 ***No disgorgement of Mrs. Jensen’s stock sale proceeds.*** The SEC seeks
17 through various remedies disgorgement of \$9 million in stock sales from Peter
18 Jensen, choosing to ignore the evidence plainly showing that Mr. Jensen did not
19 own roughly half of the shares that were sold. Every witness with knowledge of the
20 subject has testified that approximately half of the shares allegedly sold by Mr.
21 Jensen from 2006 through 2008 in fact belonged to Mrs. Lorna Jensen as her sole
22 and separate property. As a matter of law, the SEC cannot proceed against the
23 proceeds from the sale of Mrs. Jensen’s stock, and those amounts must be excluded
24 from any disgorgement or other remedy sought against Peter Jensen.

25 ***No basis for Section 304 reimbursement.*** The SEC’s claim for
26 reimbursement under Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) (15 U.S.C.
27 §7243(a)) (Seventh Cause of Action) cannot proceed because Mr. Jensen did not
28 realize any profit subject to reimbursement. Many years before the events at issue

1 in this matter, Mr. Jensen received his Basin Water shares in recognition for his
 2 contributions as the founder of the company and his service at below-market
 3 compensation. Before any alleged misrepresentation was made to the market
 4 regarding Basin Water, Mr. Jensen's Basin stock had a market value of \$25 million.
 5 As the stock price dropped, he ultimately realized far less than that – approximately
 6 \$4.5 million when he sold stock. The SEC relies on an unfounded interpretation of
 7 Section 304 to claim that the *entirety* of that \$4.5 million is profit and should be
 8 taken from him. The SEC is wrong: Mr. Jensen clearly lost money by not selling
 9 stock when he could have, and thus should not be compelled to reimburse Basin
 10 Water any amount. In the alternative, controlling authority requires that this Court
 11 reject the SEC's construction of "profits" under Section 304 and limit any Section
 12 304 reimbursement to the gain (if any) in share value realized by Mr. Jensen that
 13 was caused by the wrongdoing alleged in the Complaint.

14 A full and complete factual record exists for this Court to resolve each of the
 15 issues above. The Court should trim this matter for trial and dispose of those claims
 16 and issues for which there is no dispute as a matter of law.

17 **II. STATEMENT OF FACTS**

18 **A. Peter and Lorna Jensen's Creation of Basin Water**

19 Peter Jensen is a chemical engineer who developed a low-cost, efficient way
 20 to provide municipalities with safe, clean drinking water by removing contaminants
 21 such as nitrate, perchlorate, arsenic, uranium, and chromium-6. (Jensen's Statement
 22 of Undisputed Facts ("Fact") No. 1.) In 1999, Mr. Jensen started Basin Water, Inc.
 23 ("Basin Water") with the help of his wife Lorna Jensen. (Fact No. 2.) Mr. Jensen
 24 created the vision for Basin Water, which was to provide ion-exchange water
 25 treatment units with footprints small enough to clean contaminated well-water at the
 26 well head while creating far less waste water than the treatment systems of other
 27 companies in the field. (Fact No. 3.) To execute this vision, Mr. Jensen put
 28 together a team of engineers and scientists to develop a mobile, prototype ion-

1 exchange water treatment unit, and obtained for Basin Water several patents
2 developed by him and the members of his team. (Fact No. 4.)

3 In February 2000, Basin Water's Board of Directors authorized a grant of
4 950,000² shares to Mr. Jensen for the contributions in time and money he had made
5 and in lieu of a market-rate salary for his service as Basin Water's Chief Executive
6 Officer and President. (Fact No. 7.) Critical to the remedies the SEC is seeking in
7 this case is its assumption that all of those original founder's shares remained Peter
8 Jensen's sole property and should be subject to disgorgement. This assumption is
9 incorrect. Peter and Lorna Jensen agreed that they would share Mr. Jensen's interest
10 in his stock in the fledgling company. (Fact No. 8.) Accordingly, from 2001
11 through September 2005, Mr. Jensen periodically transferred large blocks to Mrs.
12 Jensen as her sole and separate property. (Fact No. 9.) By September 2005 (eight
13 months before Basin Water went public), Mrs. Jensen owned as her sole and
14 separate property approximately 1,320,000 shares. (Fact No. 10.)

15 At Mrs. Jensen's suggestion, she and Mr. Jensen entered into a Voting Trust
16 Agreement in 2002, which gave Mr. Jensen the right to vote Mrs. Jensen's shares.
17 (Fact No. 11.) Although Mr. Jensen had the right to vote Mrs. Jensen's shares
18 pursuant to the Voting Trust Agreement, Mrs. Jensen specifically retained
19 ownership over the shares, and Mr. Jensen did not have the power either to sell Mrs.
20 Jensen's shares or force her to sell them. (Fact No. 12.) Consistent with the Voting
21 Trust Agreement, Lorna Jensen exercised control over her shares. The Jensens
22 jointly made decisions regarding whether and how many of their respective shares to
23 sell, and Mrs. Jensen controlled the proceeds from the sales. (Fact No. 13.)

24
25
26 _____
27 ² This amount increased to at total of 2,850,000 shares after a three-to-one stock
28 split in October 2001. (Solar Dec., ¶ 11.)

1 By the time of Basin Water's Initial Public Offering ("IPO"), Mr. and Mrs.
2 Jensen owned 2,777,857 shares, of which approximately 1,320,000 shares belonged
3 to Lorna Jensen. (Fact No. 14.) Together, their shares of Basin Water stock had a
4 market value of approximately \$47 million in the weeks following the IPO. (Fact
5 No. 15.) Nonetheless, neither Mr. Jensen nor Mrs. Jensen sold any of their shares in
6 the IPO or for approximately six months thereafter. (Fact No. 16.)

7 In December 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Jensen each sold 25,000 shares, and then
8 placed 200,000 shares each into a formal 10b5-1 plan, effectively ending any say
9 either of them had on the timing of the sale of those shares. (Fact No. 18.) That
10 10b5-1 plan remained in effect, unmodified, throughout the Jensens' tenure at Basin
11 Water. (Fact No. 19.) The great majority of Mr. and Mrs. Jensen's shares remained
12 outside the 10b5-1 plan. (Fact No. 20.) While Mr. and Mrs. Jensen worked at Basin
13 Water, the remainder of their sales were pursuant to the 10b5-1 plan, over which
14 neither Jensen had control. (Fact No. 21.) All of the sales pursuant to the 10b5-1
15 plan occurred between February and July of 2007. *Id.* Mr. Jensen and Mrs. Jensen
16 did not sell any of their respective remaining shares until well after they left Basin
17 Water in 2008. (Fact No. 23.)

18 **B. Development of Financial Controls and Certification Process**

19 In its own motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 40-1)("SEC Motion"),
20 the SEC attempts to portray Peter Jensen as a CEO who knowingly manipulated
21 deals to recognize illusory income in willful violation of accounting rules. The
22 evidence shows otherwise: Peter Jensen was an executive with little accounting
23 experience, acknowledged this shortcoming, hired competent professionals, and let
24 them do their work without any interference from him. (Fact No. 24.) In other
25 words, Mr. Jensen acted in a manner entirely opposite to that of a man who is
26 attempting to perpetrate an accounting fraud.

27 As Basin Water grew through the years, Mr. Jensen realized he needed a
28 larger and more sophisticated accounting department, especially because he had

1 little accounting experience of his own. *Id.* Mr. Jensen hired Thomas Tekulve in
2 2004 as Chief Financial Officer to establish financial controls to support Basin
3 Water. (Fact No. 25.)

4 Mr. Jensen and Mr. Tekulve took several steps to build proper accounting,
5 financial, and legal systems within Basin Water to ensure the accurate reporting of
6 financial information and in order to make Basin Water “a[s] solid [an] organization
7 as humanly possible.” (Fact No. 26.) To that end, Mr. Tekulve developed and
8 implemented policies and procedures designed to meet public reporting
9 requirements, including hiring personnel and implementing procedures to generate
10 financial statements that Mr. Jensen would certify. (Fact No. 27.)

11 Next, Mr. Tekulve sought out an independent auditing firm to review Basin
12 Water’s financial statements. (Fact No. 29.) Because Basin Water had a relatively
13 small finance department, Tekulve wanted an auditing firm with whom he could
14 consult on accounting issues. *Id.* Tekulve recommended Singer Lewak Greenbaum
15 & Goldstein LLP (“Singer”) as Basin Water’s auditor in part because Gale Moore,
16 Singer’s audit partner, agreed to act as a sounding board for Tekulve on accounting
17 questions. (Fact No. 30.) In addition to the outside auditor, Basin Water also
18 received legal advice from Keith R. Solar, an attorney and board member, and
19 Latham & Watkins. (Fact No. 31.) With these professionals in place, in May 2006,
20 Basin Water raised approximately \$75 million through its IPO. (Fact No. 32.)

21 As Basin Water’s CEO, Mr. Jensen was required to certify the accuracy of
22 Basin Water’s financial statements. When certifying Basin Water’s financials, Mr.
23 Jensen was aware that Basin Water’s finance department, outside auditors, Audit
24 Committee, and attorneys reviewed Basin Water’s filings and transactions to ensure
25 accuracy and compliance with the applicable laws and regulations. (Fact No. 33.)
26 For instance, Singer performed quarterly reviews and annual audits at Basin Water’s
27 headquarters. (Fact No. 34.) Basin Water gave Singer’s auditors access to all of
28 Basin Water’s contract files, and Basin Water maintained an open dialogue with

1 Singer about Basin Water's transactions. (Fact No. 35.) Basin Water discussed
2 accounting issues with Singer by phone, at Basin Water's Audit Committee
3 meetings, and during Singer's quarterly reviews and yearly audits. (Fact No. 36.)
4 Gale Moore testified that Basin Water's management was "always very consultative
5 with the [Singer] audit team" and "always appeared to be very concerned that they
6 were accounting for transactions appropriately." (Fact No. 37.)

7 Basin Water's Audit Committee also oversaw Tekulve and Singer's work.
8 (Fact No. 38.) Singer met with Basin Water's Audit Committee at least quarterly
9 and Singer concluded in a 2007 year-end audit workpaper that "the potential risk of
10 material misstatement due to fraud . . . is low because the Audit Committee pays
11 close and detail [sic] attention to operations and transactions." (Fact No. 39.) At the
12 end of each Audit Committee meeting, Singer reported on its relationship with
13 management and any impediments it had. (Fact No. 40.) Legal counsel also served
14 as the secretary for meetings of Basin Water's Audit Committee. (Fact No. 41.)

15 In addition to Basin Water's formal accounting and compliance functions,
16 Mr. Jensen generally fostered an atmosphere of ethical compliance and business
17 conduct. (Fact No. 42.) Mr. Jensen never instructed any Basin Water employee to
18 withhold any information from Mr. Tekulve or Singer. (Fact No. 43.) Mr. Tekulve
19 is unaware of any information being deliberately withheld from Singer. *Id.* As a
20 result, Mr. Jensen understood that Basin Water's financial transactions were
21 receiving adequate oversight and that all material facts regarding Basin Water's
22 revenues were being disclosed. (Fact No. 44.)

23 **C. In Late 2006, Michael Stark Takes Over Daily Operations**

24 Soon after Basin Water went public in May 2006, Mr. Jensen decided to
25 replace himself with someone who had greater experience in running a national
26 service organization. (Fact No. 45.) Mr. Jensen approached Michael Stark about
27 joining Basin Water because Mr. Stark recently had served as CEO of the North
28 American division of Veolia, the world's largest water utility and services company.

1 (Fact No. 46.) Mr. Stark was also familiar with Basin Water, having twice
2 attempted to invest in and/or purchase it. (Fact No. 47.) Mr. Stark started at Basin
3 Water in October 2006 as President and Chief Operating Officer. (Fact No. 48.)

4 By early 2007, Mr. Stark had effectively “taken over” from Mr. Jensen nearly
5 all aspects of managing Basin Water. (Fact No. 49.) Most importantly, Mr. Stark
6 had taken complete control of deal negotiations and executive oversight of Basin
7 Water’s accounting and finance functions. (Fact No. 50.) At Mr. Stark’s request,
8 Mr. Jensen did not involve himself in deal negotiations or interactions with
9 customers. (Fact No. 51.) Similarly, Mr. Tekulve began reporting directly to Mr.
10 Stark. (Fact No. 53.) In particular, Mr. Stark directed Mr. Tekulve in early 2007 to
11 find a way to obtain third-party financing for systems already under contract with
12 municipalities. (Fact No. 54.) Mr. Stark’s directive to generate third-party
13 financing led to the VLC and WSS transactions in 2007. *Id.*

14 **D. Mr. Stark Controls the VLC and WSS Transactions**

15 In 2007, Mr. Stark stated in conference calls with market analysts his
16 intention to engage in third-party financed sales as a means of generating cash and
17 revenue for Basin Water. (Fact No. 55.) Mr. Stark arranged the hiring of a
18 consultant, Charles Litt, to conduct these financing transactions, oversaw the
19 negotiation of them, participated in Basin Water meetings concerning them, and
20 informed the investing public about these transactions. (Fact No. 56.) At Mr.
21 Stark’s direction, Mr. Tekulve began working with Mr. Litt, who pursued financing
22 arrangements with financial institutions whereby Basin Water would sell leased
23 units and transfer its rights to the capital portion of the lease payments in exchange
24 for a quicker cash recovery of its investment in building the units. (Fact No. 57.) A
25 series of these third-party financed sales – known as VLC and WSS – are the subject
26 of some of the SEC’s allegations against Mr. Jensen. (Fact No. 58.)

27 Mr. Jensen had no involvement whatsoever with the negotiation of or
28 accounting for the VLC or WSS transactions. (Fact No. 59.) Mr. Jensen was not

1 present at the Audit Committee meeting where the VLC transactions were discussed.
2 (Fact No. 60.) Also, Mr. Jensen's undisputed testimony states that he was only
3 generally aware of the VLC transactions and knew even less about the WSS
4 transactions. (Fact No. 61.) Mr. Jensen had no understanding of what VL Capital
5 was, how it came to be created, or even whether it was related to Basin Water in any
6 way. *Id.* What's more, Mr. Jensen had no understanding as to whether the WSS
7 transactions were similar in structure to the VLC transactions. (Fact No. 61.)

8 Using Basin Water's audit and review process, Singer and Basin Water's
9 Audit Committee reviewed and approved the transactions at issue. (Fact No. 62.)
10 With respect to VLC, Singer undertook an intensive review of the transactions.
11 (Fact No. 63.) It reviewed relevant transaction documents; spoke to Basin Water's
12 outside counsel about the binding nature of Basin Water's agreement with VLC;
13 spoke to Lloyd Ward, VLC's sole member; reviewed Basin Water's White Paper;
14 and discussed the transactions with Basin Water's Audit Committee. *Id.* After this
15 review, Singer and the Audit Committee approved (1) the VLC transactions, (2) the
16 company's accounting treatment for VLC, and (3) disclosure of the transactions in
17 the second quarter Form 10-Q. (Fact No. 65.)

18 With respect to the WSS transactions, Mr. Tekulve reviewed and edited
19 another comprehensive White Paper describing the WSS transaction and the
20 company's proposed accounting treatment. (Fact No. 66.) During its review of the
21 third quarter financial statements, Singer considered the WSS White Paper and
22 spoke by telephone to Mr. Ward and Mr. Litt regarding the WSS transactions. (Fact
23 No. 67.) Singer agreed with Basin Water's decision to recognize revenue for the
24 WSS transactions in the third quarter of 2007. (Fact No. 68.) At the conclusion of
25 its year-end audit for 2007, Singer rendered a clean audit opinion related to Basin
26 Water's 2007 financial statements. (Fact No. 69.) Mr. Jensen did not certify Basin
27 Water's 2007 10-K; Mr. Stark did.

1 **III. MR. JENSEN IS ENTITLED TO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

2 Mr. Jensen is entitled to partial summary judgment on the issues identified
3 below because he can show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
4 and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a); *Celotex*
5 *Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). Specifically, the following claims,
6 issues of law, and remedies should be adjudicated in Mr. Jensen’s favor:

- 7 • The SEC’s fraud claims against Mr. Jensen in connection with the VLC
8 and WSS transactions fail because there is no evidence that he had any
9 involvement at all with these transactions, much less acted with
10 fraudulent intent.
- 11 • The SEC’s claims of control person liability against Mr. Jensen in
12 connection with the VLC and WSS transactions fail because Michael
13 Stark had taken control of Basin Water by the time of these transactions
14 and Mr. Jensen played no role whatsoever in them.
- 15 • As a matter of law, proceeds from Lorna Jensen’s sales of her own
16 stock cannot be the subject of the remedies the SEC seeks against Peter
17 Jensen.
- 18 • Remedies sought by the SEC contradict controlling authority, as the
19 SEC is seeking to disgorge or otherwise take from Mr. Jensen all
20 proceeds that he realized from the sale of Basin Water stock, without
21 regard to whether any such proceeds were profits or “ill-gotten” gains
22 caused by any fraudulent misrepresentations.

23 The SEC also has before this Court a motion for summary judgment on these
24 very claims and remedies. Accordingly, the Court is positioned to dispose of all of
25 these issues on partial summary judgment, and in Mr. Jensen’s favor.

26 The SEC, as the party opposing summary judgment, must point to specific
27 facts establishing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. *Celotex Corp.*, 477 U.S.
28 at 324; *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 586–87
(1986). A factual dispute is “genuine” only if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party based on that evidence.
Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). If the nonmoving party
fails to make such a showing for any of the elements for which it bears the burden of
proof, the court should grant summary judgment. *Celotex Corp.*, 477 U.S. at 322.

1 The court can grant summary adjudication of remedies and issues of law, in
2 addition to facts. *See Watson Labs., Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.*, 178 F. Supp.
3 2d 1099, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (granting defendant's motion for summary
4 adjudication on the grounds that disgorgement of all revenues was not available as a
5 matter of law); *see also CEC Entm't, Inc. v. Kobra Props.*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6 91179, at *7-8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2008) (noting court on summary adjudication can
7 determine scope of remedies in a contract dispute as a matter of law where there is
8 no genuine factual dispute). As the facts and the law plainly show, the SEC cannot
9 meet its burden on any of the claims and issues that are subject to this motion.

10 A. **The Fraud-Based Claims Regarding the VLC and WSS**
11 **Transactions (First, Second, and Third Causes of Action) Fail**
12 **Because There Is No Evidence of Scienter.**

13 The SEC alleges that Mr. Jensen committed fraud in connection with the VLC
14 and WSS transactions because he supposedly knew that the transactions were
15 improperly accounted for, yet continued to certify Basin Water's financial statements
16 that included revenue from these transactions. But as of yet, despite years of
17 investigation, there is not a single document or witness that supports the SEC's
18 accusations. Nonetheless, the SEC moved this Court to rule that Mr. Jensen
19 committed fraud in connection with the VLC and WSS transactions. Summary
20 adjudication with respect to the VLC and WSS transactions is appropriate, but not for
21 the reasons advanced by the SEC. There is simply no basis for Mr. Jensen to stand
22 trial for fraud on the VLC and WSS transactions. The SEC itself fails to point to any
23 conduct or any statement demonstrating a fraudulent intent on Mr. Jensen's part. On
24 the other side of the ledger, the record is replete with evidence of Mr. Jensen's lack
25 of involvement in the transactions and his reliance on the Basin Water accounting
26 staff and its independent auditors to exercise their professional judgment.

27 To establish scienter, the SEC must prove that Mr. Jensen knew that revenue
28 from the VLC and WSS transactions was illusory and that statements attributed to

1 him regarding such revenue were made with knowledge of such falsity and the
2 intent to deceive. *Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder*, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976); *In re*
3 *Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 183 F. 3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999). Negligence,
4 even if inexcusable, is not sufficient. *Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp.*, 914 F. 2d
5 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations and quotations omitted). While the SEC can
6 “establish scienter by proving either actual knowledge or recklessness,” *id.*
7 (quotation omitted), recklessness requires “a form of intentional or knowing
8 misconduct” and, at a minimum, requires a showing of conscious or “deliberate
9 recklessness.” *Silicon Graphics*, 183 F. 3d at 976-77.

10 The record is bereft of any evidence that Mr. Jensen knew that the accounting
11 for the VLC and WSS transactions was improper under FIN 46R³ and nevertheless
12 certified Basin Water’s financial statements. All that the SEC can say about Mr.
13 Jensen’s supposed knowledge of falsity is that Mr. Jensen participated in
14 unidentified “internal Basin discussions” and that he failed to “ask questions” about
15 the transactions. (SEC Motion, Doc. No. 40-1 at 16:4-11.) These allegations, even
16 if true, fall woefully short of the requisite standards of knowledge of falsity or
17 “deliberate recklessness” articulated in *Hochfelder* and *Silicon Graphics*.

18 The undisputed facts demonstrate that, as acknowledged by the SEC, Mr.
19 Jensen was not an involved actor in the VLC and WSS transactions in any respect.
20 Mr. Stark directed and shepherded these deals through by bringing in his friend,
21 relative, and business associate, Charles Litt, to work with Mr. Tekulve. (Fact No.
22 56.) Mr. Stark, not Mr. Jensen, advised analysts before June 2007 that the first deal,
23 VLC, would generate revenues in the second quarter of 2007. (Fact Nos. 55-56.)
24 Further, Mr. Stark, not Mr. Jensen, answered analyst questions about VLC before

25
26 ³ FIN 46R provides guidelines and interpretation of when a Variable Interest Entity
27 must be consolidated with the financial statements of the issuer. See Boudreau
28 Declaration, Doc. No. 40-3, Exhibit 4.

1 and after the deal was completed. *Id.* In fact, Mr. Stark, not Mr. Jensen, was
2 present at the Audit Committee meeting on August 9, 2007, when the committee
3 and Singer reviewed the VLC transaction. (Fact No. 60.) Finally, Mr. Stark, and
4 not Mr. Jensen, signed the management representation letters to Singer Lewak for
5 the second and third quarters of 2007 when revenue from the first VLC and WSS
6 transactions was recognized. (Fact Nos. 52, 65, 68.) Mr. Jensen did not instruct
7 anyone at Basin Water or Singer as to how the transactions should be accounted for;
8 indeed, he did not even participate in any discussions as to whether or how revenues
9 should be recognized. (Fact No. 43; Jensen Opp. Decl. (Doc. No. 40-1) at ¶ 6.)
10 Simply put, the SEC's disapproval of the accounting for the WSS and VLC
11 transactions is not proof of Mr. Jensen's scienter, or even suggestive of it.

12 Mr. Jensen's conduct is consistent only with a *lack* of scienter. The law is
13 clear that Mr. Jensen's decision to respect the expertise, analysis and conclusions of
14 Basin Water's CFO, President and Chief Operating Officer, accounting department,
15 audit committee, and independent auditor on complicated revenue recognition issues
16 negates an inference of scienter. *See, e.g., In re REMEC Sec. Litig.*, 702 F. Supp. 2d
17 1202, 1239-1252 (S.D. Cal. 2010); *Howard v. SEC*, 376 F.3d 1136, 1147-48 (D.C.
18 Cir. 2004) (executive's actions did not amount to "an extreme departure from the
19 standards of ordinary care" when executive was told of counsel's advice and
20 followed it, which suggests "good faith") (internal quotations omitted).

21 In *REMEC*, the court granted summary judgment for a CEO under Section
22 10(b), holding that the CEO did not act with scienter when he relied on the
23 accounting decisions made by the company's CFO, accounting department, and
24 outside auditor. 702 F. Supp. 2d at 1239-41. Like this case, *REMEC* also involved
25 an issue of complexity calling for the expertise of accountants and finance
26 personnel, *i.e.*, when goodwill has been impaired and what forecasts should be used
27 in making such determinations. Like the CEO in *REMEC*, Mr. Jensen relied on the
28 "competence and expertise" of Basin Water's professionals, and precludes a

1 reasonable trier of fact from concluding by a preponderance of the evidence that he
2 acted with scienter. *REMEC*, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 1240-1241. *And the SEC can point*
3 *to no evidence to the contrary.*

4 While Mr. Jensen certified two public filings relevant to the VLC and WSS
5 transactions – the August 14, 2007 Second Quarter Form 10-Q and the November
6 14, 2007 Third Quarter Form 10-Q (*See* Ex. 55, Complaint, ¶¶ 66, 74) –
7 certification, without more, does not establish scienter.⁴ *Pedroli v. Bartek*, 564 F.
8 Supp. 2d 683, 689 (E.D. Tex. 2008.) Given the level of scrutiny by the company’s
9 President and COO, CFO, accounting department, and outside auditors of the VLC
10 and WSS transactions, Mr. Jensen in reviewing those filings had no reason to
11 believe or even suspect that the VLC or WSS transactions required further
12 investigation on his part. Indeed, it is unreasonable to expect that Mr. Jensen should
13 have waded through all the paperwork involving these transactions when he did not
14 have the necessary accounting expertise to discern whether the VLC and WSS
15 transactions received the proper accounting treatment under FIN 46R.

16 **B. The SEC Cannot Establish “Control Person” Claims Under**
17 **Section 20(a) Pertaining to the VLC and WSS Transactions**
18 **(Second and Third Causes of Action).**

19 The SEC’s control-person claim here can only survive if it establishes (1) a
20 violation of the Act⁵ and (2) that the defendant directly or indirectly controlled the
21 violator. *Paracor Finance, Inc., et al. v. Gen. Electr. Capital Corp., et al.*, 96 F.3d
22

23 ⁴ It is also noteworthy that Mr. Jensen did not sell any stock after the August 14,
24 2007 Form 10-Q while he was at the company (Fact Nos. 18-21), which in and of
25 itself “dispels an inference of scienter.” *REMEC*, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 1246, *citing*
Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d 1407, 1425 (9th Cir. 1994) (“minimal sales of stock also
negates an inference of scienter” in summary judgment motion).

26 ⁵ For the purposes of this motion alone, Mr. Jensen does not dispute the allegations
27 that Basin Water was a primary violator of the Exchange Act.
28

1 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 1996). The facts plainly show that the SEC will not be able to
2 establish at trial that Mr. Jensen was a control person for purposes of the VLC and
3 WSS transactions.

4 **1. Mr. Jensen Was Not a Control Person During the Period of**
5 **the VLC and WSS Transactions.**

6 To establish control, the SEC must demonstrate that Mr. Jensen was “active
7 in the day-to-day affairs” of the violator (Basin Water) or that he had “specific
8 control over the preparation and release of the alleged statements.” *In re Immune*
9 *Response Sec. Litig.*, 375 F. Supp. 2d 983, 1031 (S.D. Cal. 2005). The SEC, aware
10 of all the testimony that Mr. Stark took over for Mr. Jensen and then shepherded the
11 VLC and WSS transactions, nonetheless *itself* moved for summary judgment on
12 control-person liability. The Court now knows exactly what the SEC’s control
13 person argument is: Mr. Jensen should be held liable under Section 20 merely
14 because he held the title of CEO. (SEC Motion, Doc. No. 40-1 at 5-6.) But based
15 on that argument, the Court should grant summary judgment *for Mr. Jensen*.

16 Serving as a CEO, director or other high ranking officer within a company does not
17 create a presumption of control. The SEC needs to point to more than a lofty title;
18 its failure and inability to do so doom its control-person claims. *Paracor*, 96 F.3d
19 at 1163; *see also In re Hansen Sec. Litig.*, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1163 (C.D. Cal.
20 Oct. 17, 2007); *In re Downey Sec. Litig.*, No. CV 08-3261-JFW (RZx), 2009 U.S.
21 Dist. LEXIS 83443, at *49 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2009) (granting former CEO’s
22 motion to dismiss with prejudice and rejecting as insufficient allegations of control
23 based on the defendant’s position at the company, participation in setting
24 underwriting guidelines and loan loss reserves, and ownership of company stock).

25 *Paracor* is particularly instructive. In *Paracor*, investors who purchased
26 debentures brought an action against the corporation, its CEO, and several other
27 directors and officers alleging violations of federal securities laws. Although the
28 CEO was consulted on every major company decision, the evidence demonstrated

1 that other individuals “managed the company on a day-to-day basis without [the
2 CEO].” *Id.* at 1163 (internal quotation marks omitted). The CEO was described as
3 “the classic conceptualizer and idea man who leaves behind a long swath of details
4 for someone else to handle.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on these
5 facts and the CEO’s lack of involvement in the challenged transactions, the Court
6 held the CEO was not a “controlling person” and affirmed summary judgment in his
7 favor. *Id.* at 1164, 1167.

8 Here, it is undisputed that, while Mr. Jensen may have been consulted on and
9 participated in major transactions in the company’s early days, he was not involved
10 in the day-to-day management of Basin Water after Michael Stark was hired in
11 October 2006. (Fact Nos. 48-51.) It is also undisputed that, as of early 2007, Mr.
12 Stark was the primary contact for Basin Water’s customers and took over the
13 primary responsibility for Basin Water’s daily operations. *Id.* In fact, there is no
14 evidence that Mr. Jensen had *any* involvement in the VLC or WSS transactions, as
15 Mr. Stark was in charge of those transactions. (Fact Nos. 55-61.)

16 The SEC, in its own Motion, has shown its hand and that all it can say about
17 Mr. Jensen’s involvement or “control” in the 2007 to February 2008 time frame is
18 that he held the title of CEO. Given the unambiguous facts, the SEC could say little
19 else. In the absence of *facts* showing that Mr. Jensen was a control person, this
20 motion must be granted with respect to the VLC and WSS transactions.

21 **2. Even If Mr. Jensen Was a Control Person, Mr. Jensen’s**
22 **Good Faith Defense Absolves Him of Any Liability.**

23 Even where a defendant is a control person under Section 20(a), the defendant
24 may demonstrate that (i) he acted in good faith, without scienter, and (ii) that he
25 “did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation.” 15
26 U.S.C. § 78t(a); *Paracor*, 96 F. 3d at 1161, 1164 (CEO’s lack of involvement in the
27 challenged transaction and lack of absolute control over the day-to-day management
28 of the company was sufficient to prove the good faith defense). As shown above,

1 Mr. Jensen lacked scienter with respect to the VLC and WSS transactions. The
2 record also establishes beyond dispute that Mr. Jensen acted in good faith in relying
3 on Basin Water personnel and its outside auditors, and that he did not directly or
4 indirectly play any role in the recognition of revenue from the transactions.

5 Good faith may be negated by reckless conduct, but not by negligence.
6 (“[n]egligence on the part of defendants is insufficient to establish liability.”
7 *Dellastatious v. Williams*, 242 F. 3d 191, 194 (4th Cir. 2001).) Moreover, a
8 defendant’s good faith can be established by justifiable reliance on others with
9 technical expertise and on the processes used to draft and review documents. *See*
10 *Donohoe v. Consol. Operating & Prod. Corp.*, 30 F. 3d 907, 912-13 (7th Cir. 1994)
11 (affirming summary judgment in favor of principals of corporation who relied in
12 good faith on the “superior technical expertise” of other principal defendant);
13 *Dellastatious*, 242 F.3d at 196-197 (affirming summary judgment in favor of
14 corporation’s directors who relied in good faith on officers with technical expertise
15 and the corporation’s process for drafting and reviewing the offering documents at
16 issue). The record shows that Mr. Jensen had no involvement in the transactions at
17 issue and had established procedures that he relied on in good faith. Mr. Jensen was
18 comfortable signing the certifications because he “had faith in [Basin Water’s]
19 accounting department; [he] had faith in [Basin Water’s] outside auditors.” (Fact
20 Nos. 44, 70.)

21 The record demonstrates that Basin Water’s accounting department followed
22 the advice of the outside auditors. For example, in reviewing the 10-Q for the
23 second quarter of 2007, Singer recommended that the Company “beef up” the
24 disclosure regarding the VL Capital transaction. (Fact No. 64.) In response, Basin
25 Water’s accounting department included additional information. *Id.* The fact that
26 Basin Water revised the documents in response to concerns “suggests that a [sic]
27 effective policy was in place and the reviewers were scrutinizing what the drafters
28 wrote.” *See Dellastatious*, 242 F. 3d at 196-197. As Gale Moore, the engagement

1 partner for Singer testified, Basin Water staff “always appeared to be very
2 concerned that they were accounting for transactions appropriately.” (Fact No. 37.)
3 Because Mr. Jensen acted in good faith in adhering to the conclusions of Basin
4 Water’s President and COO, CFO, accounting department, audit committee, and
5 outside auditors in recognizing revenue from the VLC and WSS transactions, the
6 Section 20(a) claim fails with respect to those transactions.

7 **C. As A Matter of Law, The SEC Is Not Entitled To Remedies that**
8 **Seek Disgorgement of Stock Proceeds Belonging to Lorna Jensen.**

9 Through various remedies it is seeking, the SEC contends that Mr. Jensen
10 realized approximately \$9 million in proceeds from the sale of Basin Water stock
11 and that the entirety of these proceeds must be disgorged. (Ex. 55, Complaint, ¶ 87
12 at 46-48 (chart calculating gross proceeds as Mr. Jensen’s profit); SEC Motion, Doc.
13 No. 40-1 at 22.) The SEC’s position is an astonishing overreach: approximately
14 half of the stock sales that are subject to the SEC’s disgorgement remedies were
15 shares sold by *Mrs.* Jensen. It is undisputed that Lorna Jensen was the lawful owner
16 of approximately 50% of the shares sold. (Fact Nos. 9, 10, 14, 22.) Accordingly, as
17 a matter of law, half the proceeds from stock sales that the SEC contends are subject
18 to this action cannot be subject to any order of disgorgement or other remedy.

19 **It should go without saying, but apparently must be said, that the SEC**
20 **cannot seize the property of unaccused, non-parties.** The SEC cannot seek
21 disgorgement of Lorna Jensen’s share proceeds because she is not a party to this
22 lawsuit. *See, e.g., SEC v. Ross*, 504 F. 3d 1130, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding no
23 jurisdiction to seize the property of a non-party as ill-gotten gains because the
24 receiver “failed to take steps consistent with the Due Process Clause” by not filing a
25 complaint against or naming the owner as a relief defendant); *SEC v. McGinn*, 752
26 F. Supp. 2d 194, 219 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying asset freeze over house owned by
27 defendant’s wife as she was “not a party to this action in any capacity”) (*reversed on*
28 *other grounds* by *SEC v. Wojeski*, 752 F. Supp. 2d 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).)

1 To the extent the SEC intends to argue that Lorna Jensen did not own these
2 shares because Mr. Jensen controlled them, this is completely inconsistent with all
3 of the evidence. Mrs. Jensen acquired Basin Water shares from 2001 through
4 September 20, 2005, and owned 1,320,000 shares in her name and as her sole and
5 separate property. (Fact No. 9-10.) She and Mr. Jensen set up a voting trust
6 agreement in 2002 whereby Mr. Jensen held her shares as trustee so he could have
7 voting rights in these shares. (Fact No. 11.) Mr. Jensen did not and could not
8 control when Lorna Jensen sold these shares. (Fact No. 12.) In addition, Mrs.
9 Jensen monitored the sales of her shares through communications with employees at
10 each of the brokerage firms that maintained custody of the shares, and directed the
11 disposition of proceeds from the sale of her shares. (Fact No. 13.)

12 Accordingly, the SEC's demand for the disgorgement of \$9 million in stock
13 sales must be denied, as well as its demand that, pursuant to Section 304 of the
14 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Section 304"), Mr. Jensen reimburse Basin Water for
15 \$9 million in stock sales. *See* Section 304 (providing that only the CEO and CFO
16 of company in question are subject to requirement to reimburse profits).
17 Accordingly, the Court should enter a judgment that proceeds from the sale of Mrs.
18 Jensen's shares cannot be the subject of any disgorgement remedy or SOX 304
19 reimbursement sought by the SEC.

20 **D. The SEC is Not Entitled to Its Purported Disgorgement Remedy**

21 In connection with the SEC's allegations of insider trading, it seeks as a
22 remedy to disgorge virtually *all* of the proceeds that Mr. Jensen realized from the
23 sale of his Basin Water stock from December 2006 to August 6, 2008. (SEC
24 Motion, Doc. No. 40-1 at 21-22.)⁶ The SEC's proposed remedy of disgorgement of
25 _____

26 ⁶ While the SEC in its Complaint vaguely asserts that Mr. Jensen's "ill-gotten gains"
27 are subject to disgorgement (Ex. 55, Complaint, ¶ 87), its Motion and proposed
28 judgment make clear that it is seeking to disgorge virtually all proceeds realized by
(footnote continued)

1 all proceeds from stock sales has no basis in law. Even if one assumes that Mr.
2 Jensen did engage in insider trading, the remedy of disgorgement would apply only
3 to Mr. Jensen's *ill-gotten gains*, i.e., the amount of the proceeds that Mr. Jensen
4 realized *because* of fraud.

5 As the Ninth Circuit has explained, "[d]isgorgement is designed to deprive
6 the wrongdoer of unjust enrichment, and to deter others from violating securities
7 laws by making violations unprofitable." *SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp*, 142 F. 3d
8 1186, 1191 (9th Cir. 1998); *see also SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int'l Corp.*, 617 F. 3d
9 1072, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Disgorgement, however, must be
10 limited only to the amount by which the defendant "profited from his wrong doing.
11 Any further sum would constitute a penalty assessment." *SEC v. Blatt*, 583 F. 2d
12 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978). *See also SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.*, 458 F. 2d
13 1082, 1104-05 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that defendant could be compelled only to
14 disgorge profits and interest wrongfully obtained). Because disgorgement serves to
15 prevent unjust enrichment, the SEC must distinguish between legally and illegally
16 obtained profits. *SEC v. First City Financial Corporation*, 890 F. 2d 1215, 1231
17 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

18 The amount of disgorgement should "be a reasonable approximation of
19 profits causally connected to the violation." *First City*, 890 F. 2d at 1231; *SEC v.*
20 *Snyder*, No. H-03-04658, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81830, at *28-29 (S.D. Tex. 22,
21 2006) (where defendant sold shares after filing misleading 10Q, court adopted the
22 SEC's estimate of loss avoided as the difference between the price at which
23 defendant sold his shares and the SEC expert's estimated drops in share price due to
24 the disclosed negative information). Here, the SEC's \$9 million "calculation," in
25

26 _____
27 Mr. Jensen from the sale of his Basin Water stock, without regard to the amount, if
28 any, that Mr. Jensen's stock was inflated by any fraudulent statements.

1 addition to its baseless imputation to Mr. Jensen of the shares sold by Mrs. Jensen,
2 does not even purport to estimate any inflation in share price that Mr. Jensen may
3 have realized because of the alleged fraud. (*See* Ex. 55, Complaint, ¶ 87 at 46-48
4 (chart calculating gross proceeds from Mr. Jensen's stock sales as Mr. Jensen's
5 profit); SEC Motion, Doc. No. 40-1 at 22.)

6 Putting aside the shares belonging to Mrs. Jensen, the only basis on which the
7 SEC could proceed with its remedy that all proceeds from Mr. Jensen's Basin Water
8 stock sales should be disgorged is if all the proceeds were caused by the alleged
9 fraud; in other words, if Basin Water's stock from May 2006 to August 2008 was
10 literally worthless. But the SEC has not asserted this in its Complaint, and there is
11 zero evidence to support this notion. As Keith R. Solar, the former outside General
12 Counsel of Basin Water, has declared:

13 Mr. Jensen also anticipated that state legislatures and government
14 agencies would lower the maximum contaminant level of arsenic and
15 other chemicals allowed in public drinking water systems, which could
16 be expected to result in increased demand for a cost-effective water
17 treatment system. . . . Mr. Jensen's foresight in anticipating this
18 demand, and his ability to conceptualize and cause to be built a scalable
and cost-effective water treatment system, gave Basin Water an
advantage over its competitors.

19 (Solar Decl., ¶ 10.) Mr. Jensen's contributions had value, and the market
20 price of Basin Water stock reflected that. The SEC may not seek a remedy that
21 ignores this value and lay claim to *all* proceeds that Mr. Jensen received from his
22 sale of Basin Water stock.

23 **E. The SEC Is Not Entitled to Disgorge All of Mr. Jensen's Sales**
24 **Proceeds Under SOX 304**

25 The SEC also seeks as a remedy that Mr. Jensen reimburse Basin Water
26 under Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for over \$9 million in "profits"
27 he supposedly realized from the sale of Basin Water stock. Section 304
28

1 provides in pertinent part that when an issuer is required to prepare an
2 accounting restatement as a result of misconduct, “the chief executive officer
3 and chief financial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for any
4 profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer” in the year following
5 the first public issuance of the financial statements that were later restated. 15
6 U.S.C. §7243(a).

7 The SEC’s Section 304 claim (Ex. 55, Complaint, ¶¶ 112-115) must be
8 adjudicated in Mr. Jensen’s favor. First, roughly half of the stock that the
9 SEC has put at issue belonged to Mrs. Jensen and thus is not subject to
10 Section 304, which is limited to stock sales by “the chief executive officer
11 and chief financial officer of the issuer.” But even when limited to Mr.
12 Jensen’s stock sales, the SEC cannot prevail on its Section 304 claim as
13 styled. First, Mr. Jensen has not realized any Section 304 profits from the
14 sale of Basin Water stock. Second, even if there are any such profits, the
15 SEC’s construction of Section 304 violates due process and accordingly the
16 Section 304 remedy must be limited to any ill-gotten gains.

17 **1. There is No “Profit” Subject to a Section 304 Remedy.**

18 The text of Section 304 provides no guidance on what is meant by “profits
19 realized from the sale of securities of the issuer.” The SEC, in its demand that Mr.
20 Jensen reimburse Basin Water, contends that the entirety of the proceeds of his sales
21 be deemed “profits” and taken from him. (Ex. 55, Complaint, ¶¶ 87 and 114; SEC
22 Motion, Doc. No. 40-1 at 22-23.) Under the SEC’s theory, Mr. Jensen, as founder of
23 Basin Water, did not pay anything for his shares, and thus everything he received from
24 the sale of the shares must be deemed profit under Section 304.

25 To state the SEC’s position is to reveal the absurdity of it. The SEC’s
26 construction of “profits” under Section 304, when applied to founder’s shares,
27 would automatically result in a 100% confiscation of sales proceeds from those
28 persons least deserving of such Draconian punishment – the persons who built a

1 company from scratch. Just because a founder of a company, to the SEC's way of
2 thinking, pays "nothing" for his shares, it does not follow that all of the proceeds
3 realized upon sale should be considered "profit" for the purposes of Section 304.
4 By way of illustration, when Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer was hired in 1980, he
5 received 8% of the Microsoft shares in lieu of a higher salary. If Mr. Balmer were
6 to now sell a billion dollars worth of the shares he received in 1980, and then next
7 year Microsoft were forced to restate its prior year's earnings, the SEC would claim
8 that the entirety of that billion dollars should be "reimbursed" to Microsoft –
9 *regardless of when Mr. Balmer first acquired the stock or its value before any*
10 *alleged misstatement was made to the market.*

11 Clearly, the SEC's interpretation of "profits" is nonsensical in the context of
12 founder's shares, as it intentionally ignores all value the founder creates in the years
13 before any alleged misrepresentation is made to the market. Here, there is an
14 undisputed record of the value that Mr. Jensen created in the Basin Water stock
15 before the time any alleged misrepresentation could have inflated the value of the
16 stock. Mr. Jensen founded Basin Water and provided it with significant assistance
17 in its earliest days. (Fact Nos. 1-7.) He invested money in Basin Water, took on
18 numerous roles and accepted reduced compensation in his role as CEO. *Id.* He
19 assigned five U.S. Patents and four international patents to Basin Water, all critical
20 to Basin Water's core operations. (Fact No. 4.) In return, Mr. Jensen received
21 equity in Basin Water. (Fact No. 7.) By the time of the IPO, stock held by him
22 amounted to approximately 1.4 million shares. (Fact No. 14.)

23 Mr. Jensen's Basin Water stock was priced at \$12 per share in the May 2006
24 IPO, and quickly rose to almost \$17 per share (for a total market value of
25 approximately \$25 million). (Fact No. 15.) This \$12-17 dollar range in the stock
26 was functionally his basis in the stock and represented, as much as cash would have,
27 compensation for his prior years of service, contribution, and ingenuity for building
28 the Company from nothing. And the market price of at least \$12 per share also

1 represented the price of the stock “uninflated” by any alleged misrepresentations, as
2 Basin Water did not file its initial 10-Q until June 26, 2006 (which contained the
3 revenue associated with the Opus transaction). Yet in the subsequent years that Mr.
4 Jensen’s stock was traded through his 10b5-1 plan, he only realized one sale of
5 20,000 shares in the \$12-17 range; all of his other sales were at levels well below
6 this range. (Fact No. 21.) For instance, of the over 1 million shares sold by either
7 Mr. or Mrs. Jensen through 2009, these shares were sold as the price for Basin
8 Water shares fell into penny stock territory. (Fact Nos. 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23.) In
9 the end, Mr. Jensen did not realize the \$25 million in wealth conferred by the May
10 2006 IPO. *Id.* And while \$4.5 million in sales is a significant number, it strains any
11 notion of statutory construction to call a \$20 million evaporation of wealth a “profit”
12 for which Mr. Jensen should reimburse Basin Water.

13 In short, Mr. Jensen had losses, not profits, in the years that are subject to the
14 SEC’s 304 action. Therefore, the SEC’s demand for Section 304 reimbursement
15 should be denied in its entirety.

16 **2. If There Are Any Section 304 Profits, They Must be Limited**
17 **to Ill-Gotten Gains.**

18 Section 304’s directive that a CEO reimburse the issuer creates a remedy, and
19 cannot be construed as a penalty. In *In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig.*, 549
20 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit interpreted Section 304 as a
21 disgorgement “remedy” requiring reimbursement of “*ill-gotten* gains.” (emphasis
22 added). Courts have emphasized that remedial relief (for example, disgorgement)
23 “may not be used punitively” and is limited to amounts “causally related to the
24 wrongdoing.” *First City*, 890 F. 2d at 1231. As noted above, the remedy of
25 disgorgement is limited “to the return of amounts obtained as a result of the
26 defendant’s wrongdoing.” *SEC v. Blatt*, 583 F. 2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978); *SEC*
27 *v. Cavanagh*, 445 F. 3d 105, 117 n. 25 (2d Cir. 2006). Any amount in excess of this
28 constitutes the imposition of a penalty. *Blatt*, 583 F. 2d at 1335. As with its

1 disgorgement claim, the amount subject to the SEC’s Section 304 claim cannot
2 exceed the amount of inflation due to fraud that Mr. Jensen may have realized from
3 the sale of his shares; any amount in excess of this —such as \$4.5 million –
4 functions as a penalty. Accordingly, the only “profits” that may be disgorged under
5 Section 304 are those that were caused by the wrongdoing – *i.e.*, the inflation in
6 share price due to the alleged misrepresentations to the market. *Dura*
7 *Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo*, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).

8 Here, the SEC has brazenly sought *all* proceeds realized from the sale of
9 stock by Mr. Jensen (and even by his wife), regardless of the fact that such an
10 amount necessarily includes proceeds unrelated to any fraud. (SEC Motion, Doc.
11 No. 40-1 at 21-22.) In the alternative to a determination that Mr. Jensen has not
12 realized any profit subject to Section 304 reimbursement, the SEC’s claim for
13 Section 304 reimbursement must be limited, as with the disgorgement remedy, to
14 any inflation in Mr. Jensen’s shares caused by the supposed fraud.

15 **IV. CONCLUSION**

16 For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant Defendant Peter L.
17 Jensen’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

18 DATED: August 20, 2012

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